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Abstract 
As technology becomes more sophisticated, it becomes increasingly important to 
understand how we should ethically use technology. One question within this area of 
study is whether we should treat certain types of technology, like artificial intelligence, 
with more respect. If we do owe these machines some sort of moral status, another 
question is what level of moral status they have. In order to answer these questions, I 
argue that machines can be considered as minds under the view of machine 
functionalism. A significant problem for machine functionalism is whether it can account 
for emotions within the system it suggests. First, I argue that emotions are able to fit 
within the system using Martha Nussbaum’s framework for emotions. Second, I address 
Craig Delancey’s objections to Nussbaum’s view, and I suggest friendly amendments to 
Nussbaum’s framework. Third, I look at how Nussbaum’s view fits within the theory of 
machine functionalism. And finally, I consider the implications of the view that machines 
can have minds like humans can, and how we should treat machines in light of this 
argument. 
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I. Introduction 
 In philosophy of the mind, there is an ongoing debate about what can be reduced 
to representations. Whether something can be reduced to a representation is important 
because it has implications for how our minds and bodies interact, and how the mind 
itself functions. It has further implications for what should be considered a mind. The 
larger question that I will tackle in this thesis is whether machines can be considered to 
have a mind like a human does. If they do have a mind like humans do, then we need to 
reassess how we treat machines. This does not mean that we should treat all machines 
like humans, but that we should consider our actions to very advanced machines. In 
particular, if artificial intelligence is considered to have a mind like a human does, then 
we should not use artificial intelligence for our own means. We should treat it like we 
would treat an adult human. This means that we should not use it to advance our own 
good if we would not use a human in a similar way. We are currently at a point in 
technological advancement where we tend to think more about what we can do to 
improve human lives rather than about the possible cost to machine lives. One suggestion 
that I have from this thesis is that if a machine can meet all the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a mind, then we should treat it like we would a human.  
Before getting to these larger questions, we must first think about whether a 
machine can possibly be a mind. The leading theory that allows for machines to have 
minds like humans have is machine functionalism. Machine functionalism states that 
minds are processors of representations, and the kind of representation relevant to mind 
are those that have specific functions and causal relationships. Some disagree with 
machine functionalism on the basis that it does not properly account for emotions. If 
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emotions are not capable of being reduced to representations, then emotions cannot fit 
within the system that machine functionalism describes. To answer this question of 
whether emotions can be reduced to representations, I will first analyze Nussbaum’s view 
that emotions are the acceptance of certain types of beliefs and Craig Delancey’s 
objections to her view. If Nussbaum is correct, then emotions are reducible to beliefs, 
which are the same as representations. Therefore, emotions can fit within the system 
machine functionalism describes. If machine functionalism is able to give a robust 
account of the mind, then machines are able to be considered minds as well. 
The structure of the thesis will be as follows. First, I will reconstruct Nussbaum’s 
argument for why emotions are the same as the appreciation of a certain type of belief. 
Second, I will recount Delancey’s position and objection to Nussbaum’s argument, as 
well as other possible objections to Nussbaum’s view. I will introduce my own arguments 
against Delancey’s view, and how Nussbaum’s view can be expanded in relevant ways. 
Third, I will analyze how Nussbaum’s view fits into the larger argument that emotions 
can be reduced to representations, and what this means for the theory of machine 
functionalism. Finally, I will discuss some implications of machine functionalism that 
stem from the idea that computers can be minds. 
II. Nussbaum’s view 
 In this next section, I will further elaborate what is meant by emotions and an 
identical cognitive belief in Nussbaum’s paper “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the 
Passions”. I will begin this section by putting Nussbaum’s argument into standard form. 
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Then, I will go through each of the steps of Nussbaum’s argument and the reasoning for 
each of the moves that she makes.  
Nussbaum argues that emotions are identical to certain types of beliefs. These 
beliefs, which will be referred to as v-liefs, are beliefs that assign value to a vulnerable 
external good whose state is immediately relevant to me (Nussbaum 141). The state 
becoming relevant to me can mean that the external good has changed or that its presence 
is at the forefront of my mind. Either way, it means that not only the external good is of 
value, but that I also care about the state of the external good. For example, a v-lief could 
be my belief that my dog who is extremely important to me has died. The dog would be 
the external good, and it has value to me. It is vulnerable because it is subject to outside 
forces, such as the environment. The state is relevant to me because the dog has changed 
from living to dead. The emotion from this v-lief would be sadness from coming to 
accept my dog’s death. If I was feeling happy about my dog being alive, this happiness 
would not involve the state of my dog changing. The state of my dog has not changed 
because my dog is still alive. When I am happy about my dog, it is because my dog being 
alive is relevant to me. Nussbaum’s argument in standard form is as follows: 
1. V-liefs are judgements. (p) 
2. Someone holds a judgement when they accept it (Nussbaum 146). (p) 
3. Therefore, someone has a v-lief when they accept it. (1, 2) 
4. If an emotion is grounded in a v-lief, then the v-lief is at least part of the emotion 
(141). (p) 
5. Emotions are grounded on v-liefs (141). (p) 
6. Therefore, the v-lief is at least part of the emotion. (4, 5) 
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7. If the v-lief was only one part of an emotion, then this would imply that we assess 
the belief without any emotion (153). (p) 
8. We do not assess v-liefs without any emotion (153). (p) 
9. Therefore, v-liefs are not only one part of an emotion. (7, 8) 
10. If v-liefs are not one part of the emotion and the v-lief is at least part of emotion, 
then they are the same as the emotion (154). (p) 
11. Emotions are the same as the v-lief. (6, 9, 10) 
12. Emotions are the same as accepting a v-lief. (3, 11) 
Nussbaum begins her paper by talking about the Stoics, the name for the philosophers 
who flourished during the ancient Greek and Roman empires. Because she is beginning 
from this tradition, her definitions and arguments are derived from discussions of the 
Stoics. She specifically focuses on the work of Chrysippus in this paper. Nussbaum’s 
definition of which beliefs emotions are based on comes from Chrysippus’ work.  
In the definition of v-liefs, Nussbaum argues that they are necessary for emotions. 
E-iefs are necessary for emotions because emotions do not occur without beliefs, and 
without these beliefs emotions would be no different from other appetites. Unlike 
appetites such as thirst or hunger, emotions are not simply our base instincts and desires 
(Nussbaum 140). Therefore, there must be something that explains why emotions are not 
like thirst and hunger. The Stoics argue that this difference exists because emotions have 
an important cognitive element (140). Because emotions have this cognitive element, 
they can be evaluated like a belief can. If an emotion can be evaluated, it can be rational 
and irrational or true and false, which seems to align with how we usually judge emotions 
(140). Therefore, emotions require this cognitive part, which Nussbaum then defines. 
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V-liefs have three component parts: they are evaluative, they assign value to 
something, and they are a belief about vulnerable external goods (Nussbaum 141). The 
belief must be evaluative because it involves assigning values to something. A belief that 
is not evaluative but also judges something’s value is contradictory. Therefore, the belief 
that an emotion is based on must be evaluative. 
The belief must assign value to something. because we generally do not have 
emotions about something that does not matter to us. For instance, let us say that I have a 
belief that assigns value to something and a belief that does not. The first belief assigns 
importance to my dog. The belief that does not have value to me is that it will rain today. 
Because I am more invested in one belief than the other, I will naturally be more 
emotional about one belief over another. This is because it would be difficult for me to 
become emotional over something that has no value to me. For instance, if my belief 
about the weather was wrong and it turned out that it was sunny today, I would not be 
very emotional about it. In comparison, if I have the belief that my dog is important, then 
I would be emotional if something were to happen to my dog. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to say that emotions are based on beliefs which assign value to external goods. An 
implication of this view is that the intensity of our emotions is affected by how valuable 
something is to us. For example, my dog is extremely important to me, and my pencil 
may be somewhat important to me. If I lose either, I would be sad, but because I value 
one more than the other I would be sadder about one instance of losing something than 
the other. 
The belief must be about a vulnerable external good because they must be able to 
be affected by fortune. Nussbaum does not give a very thorough explanation for why it 
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must be based on vulnerable external goods, so I will try to expand her argument. If 
something was in complete control by us, then we would not be as emotional about it 
because we would not be emotional about it. To be emotional about something involves 
accepting new beliefs that we did not expect. But, if we are in complete control over 
something, there are no new beliefs that we did not accept. Emotions are the process of 
accepting a belief. If we have complete control, then we do not have to undergo the 
process of accepting the belief. 
The first premise is implied from the text. Nussbaum gives an account of how the 
Stoics define judgements, and from there argues that v-liefs work in the same way. 
Therefore, it is implied that judgements and beliefs are identical. A judgement is a type of 
belief because having a judgement is the same as having a value-laden belief about 
something. All v-liefs which emotions are based on are judgements, but not all 
judgements are this kind of v-lief. This is because v-liefs are not only evaluative but also 
descriptive about the state of something. If a judgement is both evaluative and 
descriptive, then it would be considered a v-lief. If a judgement is only evaluative, then it 
does not meet the requirements of a v-lief. 
The second premise comes from the Stoic’s definition of a judgement. The Stoics 
define a judgement as an assessment of an appearance (Nussbaum 146). This means that 
forming a judgement is a two-part process. First, one must form a belief about something. 
Second, one rejects or accepts this belief. After a belief has gone through this process, it 
can now be considered a judgement. For example, I form the belief that the sky is blue. 
Then, I accept or reject this belief. However, I decide to evaluate the belief is the 
judgement. If I choose to accept that the sky is blue, then the judgement is my acceptance 
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of the belief. If I choose to reject that the sky is blue, then the judgement is the 
acceptance that the sky is not blue. Either way, the judgement is framed as the acceptance 
of some belief. 
The third step of this argument is an inference of the first two steps. Because all 
v-liefs are some form of judgements, v-liefs are actually the acceptance of some belief 
that assigns value to a vulnerable external good. To hold a v-lief means to accept it. 
The fourth step begins Nussbaum’s argument for why v-liefs are at least a part of 
the emotion. This step is necessary because otherwise, one could argue that v-liefs are 
necessary for emotions, but they are not part of the emotion. For example, kidneys are 
necessary for the heart to function, but this does not mean that kidneys are included in 
our definition of the heart. If v-liefs are not at least part of emotion, then they would 
function in a definition of emotions similar to how kidneys function in a definition of the 
heart. In other words, v-liefs would be considered completely separate from emotions. 
Nussbaum believes that this relationship between these two claims exists because when a 
thing x is based on another thing y, y is included within the definition of x. For example, 
my belief that I love chocolate is based on my belief that chocolate is good. I would not 
be able to have the belief that I love chocolate unless the belief that chocolate tastes good 
is included within the belief. This is because the first belief implies the second within it. 
The belief that I love chocolate cannot imply the belief that chocolate tastes bad or that I 
have no belief about how chocolate tastes. These other beliefs are contradictory to the 
belief that the original is based on. 
In the next step, Nussbaum argues that emotions are grounded in v-liefs. One way 
we can tell that this is true is that we believe emotions can be evaluated. In other words, 
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we believe that emotions can be true or false, rational or irrational. This would mean that 
emotions could not be determined to be rational or irrational, or true or false (Nussbaum 
140). Because we believe that emotions are able to be evaluated, they must have some 
evaluative component to them. Nussbaum asserts that this evaluative component is the v-
lief. 
The sixth step is an intermediate conclusion from an inference of the fourth and 
fifth steps. The conclusion that v-liefs are at least part of emotions implies that v-liefs are 
also necessary for emotions. This conclusion is necessary for the overall argument 
because if Nussbaum only argued that v-liefs are necessary for emotions but not at least 
part of them, it would leave open the possibility that v-liefs are not the same as emotions. 
The seventh step of the standard form begins a new section of the argument. 
Nussbaum introduces an argument for why v-liefs cannot be only one part of the 
emotion. She argues that if v-liefs were only one part of the emotion, then this would 
imply that the v-lief and the emotion are completely separate. If the v-lief and emotion 
were completely separate, or one was grounded on the other, then one would first accept 
the belief without emotion. Then, they would become emotional after understanding the 
belief. For example, my important dog has died. If the cognitive aspect is separate from 
emotions entirely, then I would coldly assess the belief that my dog had died. After 
emotionlessly assessing this belief, I would then start grieving my late dog. However, 
Nussbaum argues that this is not how the process works. 
The eighth step of the premise argues that there is something flawed in this 
account of emotions and v-liefs. Nussbaum argues that if the v-liefs are only part of the 
emotions, then the emotions and reasoning are completely separate in the process. 
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However, this does not seem to be what happens in most cases. Going back to the 
example of the parent who has passed, I do not emotionlessly consider the belief that my 
parent has died. In fact, the opposite is true. What occurs in these situations is that I am 
emotionally coming to accept the belief. If this is not the process through which we 
become emotional about something, then Nussbaum must give an account for what she 
believes the process is. 
From the seventh and eighth steps, we can conclude that the v-lief is not only part 
of the emotion. There are two ways to move from this reasoning: (1) Emotions have no v-
liefs, or (2) Emotions are the same as the v-liefs. Nussbaum argues for the second option. 
This is because she earlier argued that v-liefs are at least a part of emotions. If v-liefs 
were not at least a part of emotions, then she would be able to follow the first option. This 
leads us to step eleven, which concludes that emotions are the same as v-liefs. 
Nussbaum believes that emotions are the same as v-liefs because emotions and v-
liefs cannot be separate. In the late dog case, Nussbaum believes that I am emotionally 
considering the belief that my dog has died. Because emotions and v-liefs are not 
separate during this process, Nussbaum argues that emotions and having a v-lief is the 
same. More specifically, she wants to argue that emotions and accepting a v-lief is the 
same. 
Nussbaum makes this final step because to have a v-lief means to come to accept 
the v-lief. It seems that what leads to emotion is not having the belief in of itself, but the 
process of fully recognizing the belief is what causes emotional upheaval (Nussbaum 
153). The process of acceptance is not preparing oneself for the emotional upheaval to 
come, but it is itself the emotional upheaval. For example, when I am accepting the death 
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of my parent, it is the process of acceptance that is also the process of grief. These two 
processes are one and the same. Therefore, the emotion and the acceptance of the v-lief 
are one and the same. 
III. Delancey’s First Objection 
 Now that I have fleshed out Nussbaum’s argument for why emotions and v-liefs 
are the same, in this section I will look at objections to the view. This section will focus 
on Delancey’s first objection to Nussbaum’s argument. Delancey argues that v-liefs are 
not at least a part of emotion, and that one can have v-liefs without having emotions. 
 Delancey argues that emotions and v-liefs are not actually the same. Nussbaum is 
making a flawed inference when she concludes that emotions and v-liefs are the same 
because the intermediate conclusion that v-liefs are at least part of emotions is false. This 
intermediate conclusion is false because it is based on the premise that if emotions are 
grounded on v-liefs, then v-liefs must at least be part of emotions. Delancey argues that 
there are cases in which one can have a v-lief that is necessary for emotions, but the 
subject does not have any emotion. Delancey suggests that the reason there is a 
disconnect is because Nussbaum’s argument does not properly take into account the 
effect of the extended body on the mind. 
 Delancey defines the extended body as the method through which the mind can 
interact with the environment and take in information. For example, the extended body 
for humans is our physical, biological body. The extended body acts as a two-way street 
between the mind and the environment, but it itself can still be affected. Delancey argues 
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that the extended body can be affected in ways that affect how the mind experiences 
emotion and v-liefs. 
 The strongest case Delancey gives of how the extended body affects how we 
experience emotions is of a patient who has undergone brain surgery. After brain surgery, 
the patient retains all the cognitive, reasoning aspects of their brain, but they no longer 
react to emotional stimuli as they used to. The patient underwent a test where the testers 
would see whether they would respond emotionally. Although the patient understood that 
they should react in some emotional way to certain stimuli, they felt that they could not. 
The patient seems to have all the relevant cognitive functions and even seems to form v-
liefs, but they do not have any emotional aspect with these v-liefs (Delancey 244). 
 This case is supposed to be a defeater for Nussbaum because it is supposed to 
illustrate that emotions and v-liefs are separate. If they are separable, then that directly 
contradicts Nussbaum’s claim that they are the same. Therefore, Nussbaum is making a 
flawed inference in the eighth step of her argument. Furthermore, this case shows that 
Nussbaum should take more seriously the role of the extended body in her argument. 
IV. Response to Delancey’s First Objection 
 In this next section, I will argue that Delancey’s counterexample is not 
problematic for Nussbaum’s view. First, I will bring up possible problems with 
Delancey’s view that ultimately do not work out. Then, I will introduce my own 
objection to Delancey’s argument. I will also acknowledge a possible response to my 
view, but I will explain why this response is not actually a problem for my view. 
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 A problem for Delancey’s view that ultimately may focus on the reason that they 
are separated as important. The case Delancey introduces is an exceptional case in which 
someone is not properly able to access their emotions. The patient understands that they 
should have some sort of emotional reaction to specific stimuli, but because of the brain 
surgery they do not. This shows that if the patient were able to access their emotions, then 
their emotions and their v-liefs would be identical. Rather than a case where emotions 
and v-liefs are separable, this case demonstrates that the extended body can affect the 
relationships between emotions and v-liefs. 
 Delancey may argue against this objection saying that the mere fact that someone 
can have one but not the other shows that emotions and v-liefs are one and the same. If 
they were truly one and the same, then the absence of emotions would mean the absence 
of v-liefs as well. Even if one were not accessible to the mind, that should mean that the 
other should not be accessible as well. Yet, in the case of the patient who cannot feel 
emotions, they still have the v-liefs. Therefore, emotions and v-liefs would be 
quantitatively identical, not numerically identical. 
 To change Nussbaum’s view to say that v-liefs and emotions are qualitatively 
identical and not numerically identical would be to drastically change the view. If 
emotions and v-liefs are qualitatively and not numerically identical, then Nussbaum’s 
objection that we do not coolly judge our v-liefs and then become emotional about them 
applies to this case. Therefore, we should find a way to maintain emotions and v-liefs as 
numerically identical. 
 I believe that a larger problem for Delancey’s argument is that the kinds of v-liefs 
that are formed by the patient no longer meet the requirements of v-liefs necessary for 
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emotions. The three conditions about v-liefs is that they assign a value to vulnerable 
external goods (Nussbaum 141). In this patient’s case, the beliefs still seem to be about 
vulnerable external goods. What seems to have changed is whether the patient assigns a 
value to beliefs that they had assigned value to before. Although the patient seems to 
have all the cognitive aspects of the v-liefs and nothing seems wrong with their cognition, 
it seems that the emotional stimuli are no longer as important to the patient as they were 
before. If an external good is not of value to us, then we would normally not be very 
emotional about it. Therefore, rather than v-liefs and emotions no longer being 
numerically identical, it seems that these kinds of v-liefs that the patient has is not like 
those Nussbaum had thought were relevant. 
 One could respond and say that it is incorrect to say that the patient no longer 
assigns value to the belief. To say that the patient no longer seriously values anything 
they did before seems extreme. Even if the patient has undergone surgery that leads to 
them not valuing things as they did before, there must be some things that the patient 
would still value. In the study, the patient themself recognizes that they should assign 
value to some things (Delancey 244). The fact that they recognize that they should assign 
value to some things shows that it may just be that they do not assign value to things 
within the scope of the study. 
 In this case, the number of vulnerable external goods that are valuable to the 
patient have greatly decreased. Because we do not know how the patient treated things 
outside of the study, it is difficult to say whether they experience emotions or assign 
value to things. Further, acknowledging that they should assign value to things does not 
mean that they actually assign value to it. For example, although I may acknowledge that 
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I should assign value to my economics grade, but this does not mean that I actually do. 
Without more information on how the patient is outside of the study, it is difficult to tell 
whether this is a true case of someone having v-liefs without emotions. For now, it seems 
that the patient does not have v-liefs or emotions, but it does not follow that emotions and 
v-liefs are separate. 
V. Delancey’s Second Objection 
 The second objection that Delancey brings up is that some emotions are not based 
on the acceptance of a v-lief. This objection is focused on the final step that emotions are 
the same as the acceptance of a v-lief. Delancey points out that Nussbaum is ignoring the 
possibility that emotions are not always the same as the acceptance of a v-lief. In 
particular, an emotion can be the same as the suppression of a v-lief. 
Delancey brings up the point that under Nussbaum’s view, emotions like anxiety 
would be the same as the acceptance of a v-lief. Yet, Delancey asserts that anxiety is 
derived from the suppression of rather than the acceptance of a belief (Delancey 242). 
Acceptance of a v-lief implies that the belief is clear to the holder of the belief, and they 
are able to judge whether the belief is true or false. But, when people experience anxiety, 
the belief is not clear to the holder, and they are not able to judge the belief as true or 
false. Rather, when someone is experiencing anxiety, then the v-liefs are not easily 
accessible to them. If we follow Nussbaum’s framework, then this would mean that 
anxiety would not be considered an emotion. 
 This objection brings up the problem that Nussbaum’s view may be too narrow in 
what it considers to be emotions. Anxiety, depression, jealousy are all emotions that do 
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not seem to be the same as the acceptance of a v-lief. For example, when my brother is 
jealous that his partner is talking to another person, the v-lief seems to be that his partner 
who is important to him is treating someone else nicely. However, jealousy is not the 
same as accepting this belief. Therefore, Nussbaum’s theory does not include emotions 
that we may sometimes consider to be irrational. Yet, we would not consider these 
emotions to be similar to what Nussbaum considers appetites, such as hunger or thirst. 
Nussbaum must then find a way to accommodate these emotions within her existing 
view, find another way to explain how these emotions can be beliefs, or give an account 
for why these more irrational emotions are the same as hunger and thirst. 
VI. Response to Delancey’s Second Objection 
 Similar to the third section, I will begin this section with a possible answer to 
Delancey’s problem that will not work in the end. I will show how Delancey would 
respond to this first possible objection. Then, I will discuss how Nussbaum’s framework 
can be expanded to include emotions that are sometimes considered to be more irrational. 
I will argue that an emotion can either be the acceptance or suppression of a v-lief. Then, 
I will discuss why this modification of Nussbaum’s view still works in conjunction with 
the rest of her argument. 
 A possible defeater to Delancey’s objection is that in the case of anxiety, the v-
lief is not being suppressed, but a different v-lief is being accepted. In Nussbaum’s 
argument, beliefs can be accepted or rejected. But, Nussbaum’s argument specifically 
says that v-liefs can only be accepted. If they are rejected, then another v-lief is being 
accepted. This same framework can be applied to anxiety. For example, if Alex is 
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experiencing anxiety, it could be framed as the suppression of the v-lief could be that 
Alex is worthy of the job that they want. Nussbaum would rather frame it as the 
acceptance of the v-lief that Alex is not worthy of the job that they want. This difference 
may seem to be negligible, but it makes a difference in how we think of the process. The 
process of suppression is different compared the to process of acceptance. The process of 
acceptance seems to have an end where we come to fully accept some belief. The process 
of suppression seems to have no end because there is no point in which the belief will no 
longer be relevant if the external good is of value. 
 Delancey could respond by saying that this defeater does not work because the 
processes are not actually that different. There can also be an end to the process of 
suppression, namely that there will come a point in which the belief is no longer relevant 
to the person. For example, if Alex is anxious about an interview, the emotion could be 
based on the suppression of the v-lief that the interview may go well. This v-lief becomes 
irrelevant to Alex once the interview is over. In that way, there is an end to some 
processes of suppression. Therefore, the process of acceptance and the process of 
suppression are not relevantly different when it involves v-liefs. Thus, emotions can also 
be the suppression of v-lief. This seems to be how some emotions work as well. It would 
be strange to say that anxiety about getting a job is the same as accepting that I am not 
worthy of the job. The anxiety does not end when I have fully accepted the v-lief. That 
would mean that I have fully accepted the belief that I do not deserve the job. Full 
acceptance of this v-lief seems like it would lead to more anxiety rather than stopping it. 
When I am no longer anxious about getting the job, it is because v-lief is no longer as 
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relevant to me as it once was. This seems more similar to the suppression of a v-lief 
rather than the acceptance of it. 
 Although Nussbaum’s framework specifically says that emotions are the 
acceptance of a v-lief, I believe that suppression of v-liefs can also fit within this 
framework. The reason Nussbaum argues that emotions are the acceptance of v-liefs 
seems to be because when we have emotions, we go through a process of building up the 
emotion, the climax, and the completion of the emotion. For example, when I am sad 
about my dog’s death, I go through the various steps of grief, beginning with denial. 
When I go through the grieving process, I am also coming to terms and accepting my 
dog’s death. This also works with other emotions, such as anger. When I am angry 
because someone cut me off in traffic, I begin surprised that someone has cut me off, and 
I become angry because of the event. Eventually, I fully accept the belief that I was cut 
off in traffic, and my anger fades. 
 If the reason Nussbaum considers emotions to be the same as the acceptance of a 
v-lief because they have similar processes, then suppression can also fit this process as 
well. Going back to the case of anxiety about getting a job, Alex starts out a bit anxious 
because Alex not believe that they are qualified for the job they want. Alex becomes 
more anxious as they think about this v-lief, because the belief that they am qualified for 
the job is further suppressed. The emotion and v-lief find closure because eventually the 
v-lief is no longer as important to Alex as it once was. Once the v-lief is no longer as 
pertinent to Alex, then the anxiety also fades. This example shows how suppression of a 
v-lief can also have the three stages that acceptance has: building up, climax, and closure. 
Therefore, suppression of a v-lief should be able to be the same as emotion. 
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 When Nussbaum’s framework is expanded in this way, we can give more 
thorough accounts for some emotions. Specifically, emotions that may seem irrational 
can be given rational accounts. As elaborated before, anxiety fits better in a framework of 
suppression rather than acceptance. Fear may fit better in this framework as well. For 
example, if I am afraid of heights and I am in a skyscraper looking down, then the fear 
may be the same as the suppression of the v-lief that I am actually safe. If we could only 
use a framework of accepting v-liefs, then the fear would be the same as acceptance of 
the v-lief that I am not safe. However, the fear would not end with the acceptance of this 
v-lief, but with the suppression of the opposite v-lief until I am in a position where the v-
lief is no longer significant to me. 
 Nussbaum may hesitate about expanding her view in to include suppression of v-
liefs as being equivalent to emotions because it gives rational explanations for emotions 
that we may see as irrational. In fact, she may consider those emotions which are the 
same as the suppression of a v-lief as irrational appetites rather than emotions. If they are 
appetites instead of emotions, then they do not need to be the same as v-liefs, and 
Nussbaum would be able to maintain her theory with a more restricted definition of 
emotions. However, this definition means that some feelings that we might normally 
think of as emotions would not actually be emotions at all. For example, we generally 
believe that fear is an emotion. But, with this restricted definition it would be considered 
an appetite, similar to hunger. Yet, we do not feel fear like we do hunger. It would not 
make sense to say that fear is closer to hunger than it is to anger. 
 If Nussbaum expanded her framework to say that emotions can be the same as the 
suppression of v-liefs, then not much about her view would fundamentally change. The 
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main difference is that emotions like anxiety, fear, and nervousness can be equated to a v-
lief. But, the introduction of these emotions in her framework would not challenge her 
overall structure or how the argument works. 
VII. Emotions as Representations 
 In this section, I will piece together how emotions under Nussbaum’s view can be 
reduced to representations, and what this means for machine functionalism. First, I will 
define what it means for something to be reduced to a representation and what the theory 
of machine functionalism is. Then, I will analyze how Nussbaum’s view fits into these 
two concepts. 
 A representation is defined as a stand-in for something. Representation function 
within a system in place of the mental state or attitude. A representation works in place of 
its content because representations are formed based on our interpretation of something, 
rather than the thing itself. For example, if I see a cat on a mat and form the 
representation that the cat is on the mat, this representation is not necessarily related to 
the truth of the matter. I might think that I see a cat on a mat, but I am actually mistaken. 
Representational content refers to what the representation is about. If I have a 
representation about a cat on a mat, and then the representational content would be that 
there is a cat on a mat. 
 Beliefs are a type of representation. Similar to representations, beliefs are about 
our interpretations of the world. If I have a belief that there is a cat on the mat, then this 
belief is the same as having the representation of a cat on a mat. The content of the belief 
and the content of the representation are the same. Similar to a representation, the belief 
 Yang 21 
is not dependent on the environment because it is based on our interpretation of the 
environment. Further, beliefs function in the mental system similarly to representations 
because they are also a stand-in for something. It is generally uncontroversial that beliefs 
are a type of representation. 
 Machine functionalism is a theory that attempts to define a mind. The theory is 
closely related to functionalism and the computational theory of the mind. To define 
machine functionalism, I will first define both functionalism and the computational 
theory of the mind. Because machine functionalism is a combination of both theories, 
understanding both theories first will help clarify what machine functionalism is. 
 Functionalism is the view that how a mental state is defined is based on function 
of the mental state. In other words, the mental state is defined based on how it relates to 
other mental states. For example, the mental state of pain would be defined by whether it 
is triggered by some external force, whether it triggers some sort of response, and 
whether it causes some sort of mental state. If I accidentally touched a hot stove, the hot 
stove would cause the feeling of pain, which would cause me to pull back and cause me 
to have the mental state of being in pain. These causal links in the cognitive system are 
what define a specific mental state. 
 The computational theory of the mind is a view that the mind is a processor of 
representations. It does not define how the processor works, but that it is a computational 
system that can be implemented through many different forms. For example, under the 
computational theory of the mind, if I have all of the core mental processes, then I am a 
mind. Similarly, if a laptop has all of the core mental processes, then it would also be 
considered a mind. 
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 Machine functionalism combines the key aspects of functionalism and the 
computational theory of the mind. Functionalism states that a mental state is defined by 
its role, and the computational theory of the mind states that the mind is a processor of 
representations. Under machine functionalism, not all mental states that have causal roles 
in the system are relevant. Rather, the only mental states that are relevant to the mind are 
those that can be reduced to representations. The functionalist aspect defines how the 
mind is a processor, because it says that the system is based on causal relationships. The 
computational theory of the mind aspect defines which mental states are relevant to the 
mind, because only those representations that have a function. 
 Next, I will look at how emotions can be reduced to representations. The 
argument is as follows: 
1. Beliefs are representations. (p) 
2. V-liefs are a type of belief. (p) 
3. Therefore, v-liefs are representations. (1, 2) 
4. Emotions are v-liefs. (p). 
5. Therefore, emotions are representations. (3, 4). 
All beliefs are representations. This implies that all beliefs are cognitive. If they are the 
same, then beliefs are also independent of the environment. We can form beliefs based on 
the environment, but our beliefs are not dependent on it. For example, if I were outside 
and it was raining, I may form the belief that it is raining. I then go into a building where 
I cannot see outside, and it stops raining. My belief that it is raining may not change, but 
it is not related to the truth of whether it actually is raining. In this way, beliefs can be 
related to the environment, but not dependent on it. 
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V-liefs are another type of belief that can be equivalent to representational 
content. A v-lief is a specific type of belief in which we assign value to a vulnerable 
external good. None of these qualities would make v-liefs unable to be equivalent to 
representational content. One could object and say that because the v-lief is about an 
external good, it is dependent on the environment. If something is dependent on the 
environment, then it cannot be equivalent to representational content. This is because the 
environment is outside the scope of the mind and would make the belief no longer only 
cognitive. Therefore, if a belief is about an external good, it would no longer be a 
representation. 
 Although this objection presses on the issue of how a belief can be related to, but 
not dependent on, the environment, there is a way around the objection. Similar to the 
rain example, a belief about external goods does not have to be related to the truth of the 
environment. Rather, it is related to our perception of the environment, which is still 
cognitive. For example, if I am upset because a friend lied to me, I am actually upset 
about the perception that a friend lied to me. The friend could have been misinformed and 
not known that they were giving me misinformation. Therefore, they were not actually 
lying to me. But, in the moment that I am upset, the truth of whether they are lying to me 
is not what is making me upset. What is upsetting me is my perception that they are lying 
to me. Therefore, the perception or belief is still only cognitive, and is therefore able to 
be equivalent to representational content. In this way, beliefs about external goods are the 
same as representations. Therefore, emotions are also able to be reduced to 
representations. 
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 If emotions are able to be reduced to representations, then emotions can fit within 
the framework of machine functionalism. Some argue against this conclusion saying that 
machine functionalism cannot properly account for emotions, but these objections are the 
same as the ones about emotions and v-liefs being separate. 
VIII. Implications 
 In this section, I will look at the implications if emotions are able to fit within 
machine functionalism. The main implications I am interested in are if machines can be 
considered minds like humans are, and if they are, then how should we treat machines. It 
makes more sense to talk about these objections in chronological order. So, I will begin 
with the question of whether machines can be considered minds like humans are. Then, I 
will explore whether that means we should treat machines with the same moral status that 
we treat humans with. If they do deserve to be treated like humans are, then we should 
change how we treat technology moving forward. 
 Under machine functionalism, machines can have minds like humans have minds. 
Because all the core processes are representational and not dependent on the specific 
body of the mind, both machines and humans can be considered minds. The necessary 
conditions for a mind are that it is conscious and able to think, and that it has emotions. 
These conditions do not imply that all machines are minds, but rather that the machines 
that have the necessary core functions should be considered a mind. A question that 
arises from these conditions is whether emotions are a necessary to the mind. If they are 
necessary, then not all machines would be considered minds. Only those that also have 
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emotions would be considered minds. For example, a simulated human being would 
fulfill all the conditions of being a mind, but a laptop would not. 
 Delancey argues that something cannot sufficiently be called a mind unless it has 
emotions. If a mind does not have emotions, then it is simply a processing machine. 
Under these conditions, a human mind would be equal to the chat bot that you can talk to 
online. Yet, I hesitate before calling the chat bot a mind. The key difference seems to be 
that one has emotions and the other does not. Therefore, there is something missing in the 
definition of mind if emotions are not necessary. Therefore, emotions should be 
considered necessary for a mind. From this condition, we can conclude that not all 
machines can be considered to have minds like humans. This is similar to how not even 
all humans have minds like humans. For example, children are often considered to have 
less developed minds than adults. Even though they have the potential to fulfill all the 
necessary conditions of a mind, they may still have to develop further in order to 
satisfactorily fulfill them. Similarly, some machines exist that may still be in the process 
of developing the necessary conditions through programs like machine learning, but once 
they have the necessary conditions, they should be considered a mind. 
 Examples of how to illustrate how machines can fulfill or not fulfill the conditions 
to be considered a mind can be taken from the television show Black Mirror. The episode 
“Be Right Back” is about a woman named Martha and her partner Ash. Early on into the 
episode, Ash dies, and Martha’s method of grieving involves her talking to a simulated 
version of him based on his internet usage. In the beginning, she talks to the simulated 
Ash through text, then through calls, and eventually she purchases a life-like robot that 
looks like Ash. This robot is supposed to be a substitute for the real person, but there are 
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ways in which it does not seem that the robot has a mind. Although he seems to think 
about what Martha tells him, and is able to react to situations, there are still ways in 
which his mind is different from Martha’s. For example, the simulated Ash seems to feel 
emotions, but throughout the episode there are many moments when one would expect an 
emotional response from the simulated Ash if he were a mind, but he responds coldly. He 
only gets angry when Martha tells him to, and he only cries when Martha tells him to 
(“Be Right Back”). This lack of emotion shows that the simulated Ash does not have a 
mind like Martha does, because he does not know how to experience emotions like 
sadness or anger unless told that he should.  
 In contrast, the episode “USS Callister” shows machines do seem to have minds. 
In the episode, the antagonist makes replica AI of people he works with. These replica AI 
seem to go through pain, sorrow, and joy just like their real-life counterparts do. They 
seem to think and feel just like their human counterparts (“USS Callister”). This is why 
when the AIs are tortured, many viewers feel pity or sadness for the AIs because they 
recognize them as minds that should not be tortured. Unlike the simulated Ash, they do 
not have to be told that they should feel a certain way. Instead, they just feel. These 
emotions seem as real as our own. They seem to be identical to their human counterparts 
except for the fact that they live within the confines of a video game platform. The key 
difference between these AI and the simulated Ash seem to be whether they experience 
emotion. The view that I have argued for in this thesis would argue that the AIs of U.S.S. 
Callister should be given moral status as a human, but the simulated Ash would not be 
given the same moral status. 
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 These conclusions may be seen as conflating what is a mind with what is owed 
moral status as a human. The two may not necessarily be the same, but I will give an 
account of why if something is a mind, it should be given moral status as a human. 
Before going into why I believe having a mind entails having moral status as a human, I 
will first define what I mean by this phrase. 
What it means to have moral status as a human is that we treat a being as we 
would an adult human without severe mental illnesses. To treat a being as if they have 
moral status as a human involves many attitudes toward the being. They would be 
considered a possible partner for an interpersonal relationship, we would not treat them 
cruelly without reason, and we would not treat them paternalistically. Moral status as a 
human, sometimes called full moral status, differs from other moral statuses because of 
the different attitudes we associate with them. For instance, I would not give my cat 
moral status as a human, but this does not mean I do not give her any moral status. 
Rather, I would give her moral status as an animal, which might mean that I do not treat 
her cruelly, but I would also not see her as a potential partner for interpersonal 
relationships. Similarly, we generally do not give children full moral status. For example, 
we do not allow children to make important medical decisions for themselves, and so we 
act paternalistically toward them. 
How we differentiate the different forms of moral status given seems to be about 
whether we consider something to have a mind like ours. For instance, though the child 
can have a mind like ours someday, it is still considered underdeveloped. We know that 
the child’s mind is considered underdeveloped because we do not allow children to make 
important decisions or respect their decisions about some things. If a child says that they 
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do not want a shot, we generally give it to them anyway because we believe that the child 
really understood the consequences of not getting the shot, then they would get it. 
Following the same logic, I do not give full moral status to my cat because I do not 
believe she has a mind like a human’s. 
If what is needed to have moral status of a human is to have a mind like a human, 
then machines can have full moral status. This means that we should change our behavior 
toward certain types of machines. Although there are no machines today that are as 
sophisticated as the AIs in “USS Callister,” we should be wary of how we treat machines 
moving forward. Nowadays, machines are becoming ever more lifelike. As more and 
more sophisticated machines are produced, the question will come up of whether it 
should be treated like a mind. However, if it fulfills all the conditions, then it should be 
granted full moral status. Therefore, we should not treat the machine like we would 
others. We should not use the machine for our own means and do nothing to help it fulfill 
its own goals. If a machine is sophisticated enough to be conscious and have emotions, 
then we should not use it as a tool for human self-gain. 
IX. Conclusion 
 In this thesis, I have attempted to add to the ongoing debate about what can be 
reduced to a representation, and what cannot. I have argued in favor of Martha 
Nussbaum’s framework for emotions and addressed Craig Delancey’s objections to her 
view. Then, I looked at implications of Nussbaum’s view, namely how does it affect what 
we consider a mind. If this view is correct, then machine functionalism holds true, and we 
should change how we treat machines. There are still further questions of if a mind is 
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sufficient to have moral status as a human, and arguments for what the necessary 
conditions of a mind should still be fleshed out. Unfortunately, these questions are 
outside the scope of the paper.  
 Another interesting question to think about is whether a machine would be able to 
consent. For example, from this view we cannot force artificial intelligence to do certain 
actions for us because we would not be treating them as we would treat a human. We 
cannot force them to be our personal assistants or force them to be customer service 
agents unless we have their consent to assign them to particular jobs. However, there is a 
further question of whether the artificial intelligence would be able to consent at all even 
if we asked. They may be able to literally agree to what we ask them to do, but in a way 
they may not actually be giving their consent. Because artificial intelligences are 
programmed, it is possible that they only consent to certain actions because they are 
programmed in a specific way. Therefore, the consent would be more performative 
because it would not actually be able to give real consent. 
 One way to address this question is to say that if we consider machines to have 
minds like humans have minds, then this implies that machines would be able to give 
consent. If we do not believe that a specific machine cannot give consent, then this may 
mean that the machine may not have the necessary requirements of a mind. If the 
machine did meet the necessary requirements of a mind, then there would not be a 
question of whether it can give consent. This is only a start to answering this question, 
and a more in-depth answer will have to come in a future paper. 
 The area of machines and ethics of treating machines is incredibly interesting, and 
many of the principles of ethics toward humans overlap. In this thesis, I take on the 
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strong position that if machines meet all the necessary requirements of a mind, it should 
be given the same ethical treatment as a human. Others believe that machines can be 
minds, but these minds are different from human minds. Therefore, we do not owe 
machines the same considerations as humans even if they are considered minds. This 
thesis is my first step into the field, but there is more work to be done in the future. 
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